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PREFACE 
The history of psycholinguistics, as with most sciences, has 
been marked by false starts, dead ends, and seemingly fruitless 
avenues of research. OVer a period of time, several theories of 
language processing and language learning have been offered only to 
be discarded in the light of discrepant data and unexplained 
linguistic phenomena. However, it is neither the intention nor within 
the scope of the present paper to discuss all of the historical 
foundations for the present state of psycholinguistic research. The 
historical background for language studies is discussed only as it 
relates to the development of a transformational model of generative 
grammar. 
Prior to any consideration of language as the object of 
scientific research, the format of the present paper must be delineated. 
Firstly, a short history of scientific language study will be presented. 
Secondly, linguistics will be treated in terms of the development of a 
transformational model of generative grammar according to Chomsky's 
standard theory. Thirdly, the basic distinctions between linguistic 
competence and performance will be delineated, and the concepts of 
deep and surface structure defined. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its long history, linguistics has been claimed as 
the stepchild of many disciplines: philosophy, rhetoric, philology, 
history, and only very recently psychology. As far back as the ancient 
Greeks, questions were raised concerning the relationship between an 
object and its verbal description. The study of language continued to 
be of interest because of its apparent specifically human character-
istic, and as such was approached from a variety of directions. 
Depending on the assumptions made about the nature of language, 
various schools of linguistic research developed. From the standpoint 
of philosophy, language was treated as an introspective phenomenon 
whose essential nature was only discoverable from the self-reports of 
the individual. As such, language study was constrained by the 
parameters of memory limitations, forgetting, and stimulus-cue 
generalization. In short, an understanding of language was only as 
accurate as the person reporting the data. 
History and Development 
The scientific approach to language was first developed by 
Bloomfield and the structuralist schools of linguistics. The 
fundamental distinction in theory between form and meaning, or 
structure and content, originally formulated by De Saussure, was 
accepted by the structuralists. Language was then to be investigated 
1 
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as a formal structure separable from meaning or content. This 
theoretical clarification served to separate the study of language 
from the less-objective approaches of philosophy. 
The principal aim of the structuralist school was to develop 
a methodology for the discovery of the basic units of language, which 
method was called constituent analysis. These units were to be 
considered in their objective structural form without consideration 
of the cognitive or mental contents underlying them. The basic 
language components were specified as minimal sound units, termed 
phonemes, and minimal syntactic units, termed morphemes. By describ-
ing the units of language structure and the syntactic combination of 
these units, the linguist was able to derive the grammar of the 
language under investigation. 
By definition, then, the structural or taxonomic linguist dealt 
with the formal structure of language. The linguist analyzed objective 
language utterances and attempted to identify and classify the 
structures and rules of combination and ordering. 
Late in the 1950's another discipline was emerging which 
combined linguistics and psychology called psycholinguistics--the 
study of the language-user (cf. Osgood & Sebeok, 1965). As Hormann 
(1970) stated, the object of this psycholinguistics was not to describe 
language as a formal structure but to describe the process of language 
use. Psycholinguistics, then, viewed psychology as a natural and 
necessary partner to linguistics. 
About this same time the linguist Noam Chomsky presented a 
3 
different approach to linguistic analysis called Transformational 
Generative Grammar. This approach accepted the basic form-content 
distinction from the structuralist school. But Chomsky (1957) began 
a revolution in language study by formulating the goal of linguistics 
as description and explanation of the linguistic intuitions of a 
native speaker-hearer. He hypothesized a deductive model of grammar 
for an idealized speaker-hearer, from a totally homogeneous language 
community, who knew and used perfectly the rules of grammar. 
Chomsky attempted, then, not only to describe the particular 
linguistic data, but also to explain the descriptions in terms of a 
universal grammar. In 1965, he formally presented the Standard Theory 
of transformational generative grammar. This model proposed to provide 
a structural description for all, and only all possible sentences 
gramatically acceptable to a native speaker-hearer of English. In 1972, 
Chomsky developed the Extended Standard Theory of transformational 
grammar which incorporated some of the subtle semantic data which could 
not be handled by the original theory. 
This new direction in linguistic investigation was soon in-
fluential in the psychological research on language. Miller first 
brought Chomsky to the attention of the psychological community. He 
presented the results of the first experimental studies of sentences 
based on a transformational model of syntactic structure. The results 
were consistent with two of Chomsky's theoretical axioms. The first 
was that the sentence was not merely a combination of words and 
associations, but rather that "the structure of the sentence contrib-
4 
utes as much to its interpretation as its elements. Therefore, the 
understanding of the sentence could not be expected as a by-product 
of the study of the word" (Gough, 1971, p. 255). Prior work by 
psychologists (cf. Gough & Jenkins, 1963) had dealt almost exclusively 
with the word, its related properties of meaning associations, and its 
role in memory and perception. The second was Chomsky's demonstration 
that sentence comprehension and production was a species of rule-
governed behavior (Greene, p. 11, p. 19). 
As described by Gough (1971) transformational grammar ascribed 
to every sentence a number of properties: degree of grammaticality, 
surface and deep structure, and transformational complexity. These 
properties were hypothesized to be not only linguistic constructs, 
but in some sense, psychological realities. A succession of 
psychological studies examined the effects of these properties. Early 
research had shown that grammatical sequences of words are both 
perceived more easily and also memorized more readily than a randomly 
ordered sequence of words (Miller, Heise, & Lichten, 1951; Miller & 
Selfridge, 1956). Later, degrees of grammatical well-formedness were 
shown to be related to the ease with which sentences could be repeated 
(Epstein, 1961), memorized (Marks & Miller, 1964) or paraphrased 
(Downey & Hakes, 1968). Clifton and Odom (1966) found that perceived 
similarity between sentences was related to the differences in 
transformational complexity between the sentences. 
The above research delineated the importance of syntactic 
structure and Chomsky has been further responsible for much of the 
5 
current interest in language comprehension, long-term storage of 
sentences, depth of comprehension, and retrieval of stored linguistic 
inferences. 
constructs 
Competence and performance. A key concept in the theory of 
chomsky was that of the distinction between competence and performance. 
Basically competence refers to what a native speaker-hearer knows of 
his language, and performance to how he uses it. While the concept of 
performance is fairly straightforward, that of competence is not. 
Lenneberg (1967) suggested that part of the difficulty lay in the misuse 
of the word "grammar." Grammar has alternatively referred to an abstract 
linguistic model of grammatical rules and to an internalized set of 
these rules and their actual use in sentence comprehension and pro-
duction. 
The abstract model of grammar was a linguistic grammar which 
generated structural descriptions for all and only all the sentences of 
a language. This model proposed to describe and explain an idealized 
speaker-hearer's competence or knowledge of grammar. The idealized 
speaker-hearer was hypothesized to possess perfect intuition about the 
grammaticality of sentences in the language. Chomsky himself best 
summarized the nature of this type of competence model. "A generative 
grammar as it stands is no more a model of the speaker than it is a 
model of the hearer. Rather ••• it can be regarded only as a 
characterization of the intrinsic tacit knowledge or competence that 
underlies actual performance" (1965, p. 140). 
•• 
.... 
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The linguistic data for this model were the possible, grammati-
cally well-formed sentences of an idealized speaker-hearer. These 
sentences were described in terms of the linguistic constructs: 
generative syntactic phrase-structure and transformational rules, and 
interpretive semantic and phonological rules. This model of grammati-
cal competence projected no claim about the actual use of the rules 
of grammar by the native speaker-hearer, nor were its data the 
sentences of language as actually produced by a particular speaker. 
The second concept of grammatical competence, internalized 
rules, and their actual use, described something more than the abstract 
knowledge of grammar of an idealized speaker-hearer. Somehow, an 
actual native speaker-hearer had mastered and organized a grammar in 
a manner similar to the idealized competence model. In this second 
sense, grammar competence became a performance variable in actual 
language use. 
Part of the problem in understanding the competence model has 
been in failing to distinguish the two understandings of grammatical 
competence. Chomsky has on many occasions disclaimed the notion that 
the competence model in any way described the actual process of 
sentence production or comprehension. Yet he seems also to have on 
occasion implicitly argued for the internalized competence model in 
actual comprehension and production of sentences (Chomsky, 1965, p. 8; 
1972a, p. 116). 
Fodor and Garrett (1966) attempted to clarify the situation by 
formally specifying the two ways in which competence may be understood • 
7 
The first understanding was that of competence as a formalization of 
a speaker-hearer's grammatical information. In this sense competence 
is not to be confused with behavior, where behavior is the corpus of 
actual linguistic experience indicative of the speaker-hearer's 
grammatical knowledge. 
The second type of competence referred to the speaker-hearer's 
linguistic capacity which interacts with other mechanisms in the 
production of verbalizations. This competence includes knowledge 
of the language, and the psychological processes which interact with 
this knowledge. This second type of competence was termed internalized 
competence and although rejected by Fodor and Garrett, it represented 
the closest link to a possible performance model of grammar. 
In addition to changing the relationship between the under-
standing of competence and performance, the notion of internalized 
competence necessarily changed the data base for its grammatical 
model. Because the production component had become such a large part 
of the model, the idealized speaker-hearer was no longer an adequate 
source for the linguistic rules. The rules had to be derived on the 
basis of the actual linguistic productions of the native speaker. 
Performance, then, became an important component of the inferred 
internalized grammar of the actual speaker-hearer. A definition of 
actual performance, however, has been difficult to specify because it 
involves so many different processes in the actual native speaker-
hearer. This includes all those cognitive processes underlying the 
production and comprehension of sentences, such as perception, storage, 
8 
and retrieval. 
Lenneberg (1967) defined performance in terms of the extra-
linguistic beliefs of the speaker-hearer and the cognitive principles 
mentioned above. Performance was presented as a perceptual model 
and Lenneberg challenged psychologists to define the parameter of this 
model. 
Fodor and Garrett (1966) took a different tack in the discussion 
of linguistic performance. Performance was conceived as the behavioral 
manifestation of the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his grammar. In 
this context, the nature of the linguistic knowledge is inferred and 
formalized from observable behavior and is seen as entirely separate 
from the model of abstract competence. 
Understood in this way, the psychological relationship between 
competence and performance was amenable to experimental study. 
Deep and surface structure. Equally as fundamental to an 
understanding of the transformational generative grammar model was 
the distinction between deep and surface structure. The surface 
structure of a sentence was defined as the final perceptual form of 
the sentence. This level contained the final sequence and arrangement 
of words, generated by syntactic rules, and interpreted by the 
semantic and phonological rules of the grammar. 
The deep structure of the sentence was defined as the abstract 
syntactic structure which specified the underlying syntactic structures 
and their relationships necessary for an interpretation of the sentence. 
Deep structure categories and relations determined the final organizations 
b 
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and sequencing of linguistic elements in the final surface structure. 
Chomsky (1972) used the following example to illustrate this 
surface--deep structure distinction: "Invisible God created the 
visible world." The sentence level which is composed of the sound 
signal corresponds to the surface level. However, underlying the 
form of this sentence three propositions are hypothesized: that 
God is invisible, that he created the world, and that the world is 
visible. The three propositions interrelate to form the deep 
structure. 
A further example of this distinction is the following: The 
process which Tom, who you know, described failed. This is the final 
surface structure. According to Chomsky's theoretical model, a 
basic structure was hypothesized as underlying the surface structure; 
i.e., The process failed. However, embedded within the surface 
sentenc~ were two other hypothesized sentences: Tom described the 
process, and You know Tom. These hypothesized underlying sentences 
were then mapped into the surface structure through such transforma-
tional operations as addition, deletion, and substitution. 
The distinction between the deep_and surface structure of 
sentences, and the competence and performance of speaker-hearers are 
of theoretical interest if one is to establish cognitive universals 
of linguistic analysis. The psycholinguist asks the question: What 
does the native speaker-hearer know about his language? He wants to 
establish as a psychological reality the basic cognitive principles 
underlying knowledge of a grammar. If the concepts of deep and 
II. 
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surface structure are viable principles of cognition, then the 
individual knows more about his language than is evident from the 
perceptual sentence output. The deep and surface structure dis-
tinction should reveal empirical differences in sentence processing. 
CHAPTER II 
LINGUISTIC PROCESSING OF AMBIGUOUS SENTENCES 
Ambiguous Sentences: A Definition 
The ambiguous sentence has been hypothesized as one grammatical 
structure which could be useful in empirically demonstrating the 
psychological validity of deep and surface structure and perhaps 
clarifying the competence-performance distinction. Ambiguity may 
be defined as a set of stimulus patterns, in this case the sentence 
constituents, which admits of two or more interpretations. 
Ambiguity may arise from the deep or surface structure of a 
sentence in more than one way. Ambiguity in the surface structure is 
resolved by any simple rearrangement of the constituents. Resolution 
of the ambiguity does not involve complex analysis of the underlying 
syntactic or semantic relations. An example of ambiguity in the 
surface structure is the following: The three masted British ships 
were sailing south. Segmentation of the sentence before the word 
three suggests that an unspecified number of British ships with three 
masts sailed south. Segmenting the sentence after the word three 
suggests that three British ships with an unspecified number of masts 
sailed south. The two interpretations underlying the ambiguous 
sentence were derived from the same surface structure constituents. 
Although the ambiguity is found in the surface structure, it is the 
underlying syntactic relationship of the adjective three to the noun 
11 
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phrase constituent of the sentence that determines the position of 
the segmentation. 
The resolution of deep structure ambiguity involves more than 
simply rearranging the surface structure components. An example of 
deep structure ambiguity is the following: The shooting of the 
hunters was terrible. A simple rearrangement or segmentation of the 
surface structure cannot resolve the ambiguity. What is implied in 
this sentence is a more complex relationship of the gerund shooting 
to the prepositional phrase of the hunters. Either the hunters are 
the object of the shooting (the hunters were the ones who were shot) 
or the hunters themselves did the shooting. Because the implied 
relation between the gerund and prepositional phrase is one of actor 
or acted upon, this type of ambiguity is termed deep structure 
syntactic ambiguity. Appendix A contains the tree diagrams 
illustrating the underlying syntactic relations. 
Another type of ambiguity may be termed lexical ambiguity. 
This type of ambiguity focuses on the semantic referent of a surface 
structure constituent. In the following sentence: The soldier filled 
the tank. the ambiguity lies in the lexical referent of the word 
tank. Again, a segmentation of the surface structure constituents 
does not resolve the ambiguity in the sentence, nor does a specification 
of the syntactic relations. Only when the lexical referent of the 
noun phrase is determined can the possible interpretations of the 
sentence be resolved. In the above sentence, the word tank can refer 
to a receptacle for liquids, or it can refer to a portable military 
13 
weapons system. 
In summary, there are two types of ambiguity, syntactic and 
lexical. Syntactic ambiguity may arise in the surface structure or 
in the underlying deep structure. Lexical ambiguity arises in the 
specification of the referent of a word or constituent in the 
sentence. 
Review of Research 
In recent years, much psycholinguistic research has been 
directed toward the psychological processes involved in the under-
standing of ambiguous sentences. The research will be reviewed as 
follows: 1) reasons for studying ambiguous sentences; 2) a discussion 
of the empirical definitions of ambiguity; 3) the use of perception 
time as a methodology for studying ambiguity; 4) bias as a factor in 
ambiguity resolution; 5) the postulating of a linguistic processing 
hypothesis; 6) the importance of prior experimental cueing for the 
comprehension of ambiguity; and 7) a summary. 
Experimental rationale and definition. Empirical study of 
ambiguous sentence processing is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, 
Cairns (1973) stated that many, if not all, fully processed unambiguous 
sentences are ambiguous prior to their conclusion, and if the psycho-
linguistic processes associated with the ambiguous sentences can be 
discovered, then inference into the day-to-day comprehension of non-
ambiguous linguistic input can be made. Secondly, the study of 
ambiguous sentence processing may provide insights into the psychological 
aspects of the deep and surface dichotomy, and perhaps reveal something 
I 
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of abstract sentence processing hypothesized for all language 
performance. 
In general, however, psycholinguistic research has failed to 
specify how a native speaker-hearer interprets and understands the 
possible interpretations associated with the ambiguous sentence. 
Gleason (1965) stated that previous research failed to specify an 
adequate operational definition of ambiguity and as a result the 
interpretation of some of the experimental results has been tenuous. 
In rectifying this problem, MacKay and Bever (1967) empirically 
defined sentence ambiguity as any stimulus pattern which is capable 
of two and only two distinct interpretations. Ambiguous sentences 
can have more than two meanings, but limiting the sentences to only 
two interpretations has the effect of permitting the ~ to make more 
accurate inferences about the cognitive comprehension process. If 
only two meanings are possible, direct comparisons can be made 
between the experimental sentences. 
MacKay and Bever (1967) empirically defined one type of 
ambiguity as syntactic ambiguity in the surface structure of the 
sentence. This level was represented by the various ways in which 
the same sentence could be segmented to yield more than one meaning. 
An example of such sentence ambiguity is the following: The three 
masted British ships were sailing south. (as discussed on page 11). 
A second type of ambiguity was related to the underlying, or 
syntactic deep structure of the sentence. The underlying syntactic 
relation between constituents was the locus of the ambiguity. An 
II\ l'i 
I
; b 
15 
example is the sentence: The shooting of the hunters was terrible. 
(as described on page 12 and schematically diagramed in Appendix A.) 
A third type of ambiguity was empirically defined as semantic 
or lexical ambiguity. As stated on page 12 this type of ambiguity 
involves ambiguity in the lexical referent of a word or words in the 
sentence. An example of this type of ambiguity is the following: 
The soldier filled the tank. 
MacKay and Bever (1967) also described a more complex type of 
ambiguity. These sentences involve a combination of both surface 
syntactic structure and semantic referent ambiguity. An example of 
a sentence which is ambiguous in both lexical referent and syntactic 
surface structure is the following: He unclogged the pipe in the 
bathroom. Ambiguity arises from uncertainty about the meaning of the 
word ~' and the surface structure segmentation of the constituents. 
Should the major break come after unclogged or pipe? What type of 
~ is being referred to in the above sentence? Also, was the ~ 
taken to the bathroom and cleaned or was the ~ already a part of 
the bathroom and cleaned? 
Perception time. Among the various methods used to measure 
linguistic processing of ambiguous sentences, perception time (PT) 
has been most frequently and successfully utilized. Perception time 
was defined as the latency between the presentation of the ambiguous 
sentence and the S's resolution of the ambiguity. MacKay (1966) used 
a sentence completion task with perception time as a means of measuring 
ambiguity comprehension. In the completion task, the Ss were given 
16 
ambiguous sentence fragments and required to complete them. The time 
to complete each fragment was defined as the perception time. MacKay 
found increasing processing time in the following order: unambiguous 
sentences, lexical ambiguity, surface structure ambiguity, and finally 
underlying syntactic ambiguity. 
Using a different type of task, MacKay and Bever (1967) found 
perception time to be a function of the type of ambiguity. In this 
study ~s were asked to search for the second meaning of the ambiguous 
sentence. Perception time for lexical ambiguity was shorter than for 
the sentences involving surface structure ambiguity. The longest 
perception times were found in the sentences which involved syntactic 
deep structure ambiguity. 
Mistler-Lachman (1972), however, found a different relation-
ship between the perception times for the various types of ambiguity. 
Her study employed three types of ambiguity and five types of response 
tasks. The five tasks were: 1) comprehension for meaningfulness 
without context; 2) comprehension for meaningfulness with context; 
3) comprehension for context integration; 4) comprehension for 
production without context; and 5) comprehension for production with 
context. The first task required the ~ to judge whether a target 
sentence was meaningful or not without the presentation of context. 
The second task required the S to make the same meaningfulness judgment 
with the addition of context preceding the target sentence. The third 
task required the ~ to judge whether the target sentence followed from 
the context given. The fourth and fifth tasks required the ~ to make 
b 
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up a sentence which would follow the target sentence. Ss were told 
that their sentence should follow reasonably from the target sentence. 
In the fourth task the production was made without preceding context, 
and in the fifth task preceding context was provided. The Ss were 
told that they need not necessarily use the context in the production 
of their sentence. 
For the purpose of the present study, the meaningfulness task 
without context is most relevant. Meaningfulness judgment was defined 
as the judgment of whether a sentence was meaningful or nonsense. In 
this task, the latency was measured from the time the sentence was 
visually presented to the time when the ~ had completed a judgment. 
Mistler-Lachman (1972) found no significant differences in the 
latencies meaningfulness judgments for the different categories of 
ambiguity. 
Ambiguous sentences: Bias. As a variable of study, biased 
meanings of ambiguous sentences have been hypothesized to affect 
perception time. In general, meaning bias is defined as the S's 
preference for one meaning over another in an ambiguous sentence. The 
higher the preference for one meaning, the greater the likelihood that 
this meaning will be perceived first or solely in the resolution of 
the ambiguity. Although the above definition is generally applicable, 
Es have defined bias according to the demands of the experiment. 
Defining bias as the percent of Ss in a pre-study who reported 
seeing one of the meanings first, MacKay and Bever (1967) found that 
longer PTs were obtained when the first interpretation seen by the ~ 
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was the less biased meaning. This relationship was especially noted 
in underlying syntactic structure ambiguity. PT was also greater for 
lexical and surface ambiguities, when one of the meanings of the 
sentence was more probable. The longer PT was found, however, regard-
less of whether the more or less probable meaning was seen first. 
Mehler and Carey (1968) used subject expectation as a definition 
of bias. Ss were given 11 specially prepared pictures followed by 11 
sentences presented through earphones. The S was to mechanically 
indicate by flipping a switch whether each sentence was true or false 
with respect to the picture. The sentences were either a predicate 
nominative construction or a transitive verb construction. For one-
half of the Ss 10 of the sentences were a predicate nominative 
construction, e.g., They are performing monkeys., followed by a sentence 
containing a transitive verb, e.g., They are bombarding cities. The 
other half of the Ss received 10 transitive verb constructions 
followed by a predicate nominative. The results showed that processing 
latencies for true sentences containing an unexpected surface structure 
were longer than for sentences with an expected structure. 
Carey, Mehler, and Bever (1970) used the same definition of 
expectation as above with a picture verification task. Ss were 
auditorily preset to expect a sentence with either a predicate 
I 
'' nominative or transitive verb construction followed by an ambiguous 
sentence of the type: They are lecturing doctors. Pictures which 
made one of the meanings of the sentences true or false, followed the 
sentences. The results showed that Ss who heard the ambiguous materials 
I' I 
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as consistent with the preset structure had latencies equal to those 
of non-ambiguous sentences. Ss who heard the ambiguous sentence as 
being inconsistent with the preset structure showed longer latencies 
than ~s who had been set for the reading they heard. 
Cairns (1973) pre-experimentally defined bias as the proportion 
of a sample of Ss who perceived a particular meaning of a sentence. A 
sentence may have an 80% bias if 80% of the Ss perceived one meaning 
of an ambiguous sentence. Sixteen lexically ambiguous sentences were 
presented with a second sentence which served to disambiguate the 
first. The results showed that highly biased ambiguous sentences 
associated with unexpected sentences had longer latencies than un-
ambiguous sentences paired with unexpected sentences. Pairs containing 
highly biased ambiguous sentences paired with expected sentences 
resulted in the same latencies as for unambiguous sentences paired 
with expected sentences. 
In summary, from the above studies perception time seems a 
reliable response variable to measure the complexity of linguistic 
processing. Perception time has been used to study the effect of 
ambiguity and bias on processing. On the assumption that perception 
time reflects a portion of cognitive functioning, valid hypotheses 
were derived concerning ambiguous sentence comprehension. 
Linguistic processing hypothesis. Foss, Bever, and Silver 
(1968) postulated three distinct comprehension processes employed by 
the ~ when confronted with ambiguous sentence interpretation. Model 
I hypothesized that the native speaker-hearer analyzes all possible 
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interpretations of the ambiguous sentence and then chooses from among 
these interpretations the one most appropriate. Model II hypothesized 
that sentence interpretation is withheld until further information or 
context is provided allowing a single interpretation. Model III held 
that Ss tend to assign one meaning to a sentence until further in-
formation allows a different interpretation. Using a picture 
verification task the results of the study showed that verification 
time was not significantly different for ambiguous or non-ambiguous 
sentences. Verification time was defined as time taken by the S to 
state whether or not a picture supported an interpretation of an 
ambiguous sentence. These results suggested that Ss first assigned 
one meaning to a sentence thus supporting Model III. 
The "one-meaning hypothesis" implies that only one meaning of 
an ambiguous sentence is comprehended (cf. Carey, Mehler, & Bever, 
1970). Studies manipulating bias have presented some support for a 
single meaning hypothesis. MacKay and Bever (1967) found longer PTs 
when the first interpretation seen by the S was the less probable. If 
two interpretations had been processed and simultaneously available, 
no effect would have been noted for bias. The fact that a less probable 
meaning increases latency suggests that both interpretations were not 
immediately available. Using ~expectation as a type of bias, Mehler 
and Carey (1968) further demonstrated that processing latencies for 
true sentences containing an unexpected surface structure were longer 
than for true sentences with an expected structure. A two meaning 
hypothesis was inconsistent with these data. 
I. 
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cairns (1971) however, questioned the generality of the one-
m~aning hypothesis. She tested both lexically and syntactically 
ambiguous sentences, each highly biased toward one meaning. Cairns 
(l971, 1973) had pre-experimentally defined sentence bias as the 
percentage of Ss who perceived a particular meaning of a sentence. 
ss were presented with pairs of sentences (1971). The first was 
lexically or syntactically ambiguous and the second was not. The S 
was to judge whether the second sentence was compatible with the 
ambiguous sentence meanings by pushing a ~ or ~ button. 
To explain the process Cairns (1971) hypothesized the operation 
of a Language Comprehension Device (LCD} which is a type of cognitive 
organization capable of comprehending all and only all of the sentences 
produced by the language grammar. If the LCD were operative for all 
levels of ambiguity then an increasing latency should reflect the 
reprocessing technique necessary in the compatibility judgment if the 
~comprehended both meanings of the ambiguous sentence. The results 
of the compatibility judgment showed an increased latency time only 
for the lexically ambiguous sentences, but not for the syntactically 
ambiguous sentences. Consequently, the LCD was hypothesized to be 
capable of simultaneously computing and analyzing two interpretations 
for the biased syntactically ambiguous sentences. However, the two 
meanings of the lexically ambiguous sentences were hypothesized to be 
analyzed immediately upon receipt by the LCD in succession rather than 
in a parallel manner. 
To further investigate this latter hypothesis Cairns (1973} 
\ 
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presented the Ss with 16 lexically ambiguous sentences and a second 
s~ntence which served to disambiguate the first. One-half of the 
ambiguous sentences were highly biased and the other half were 
relatively unbiased. Four types of sentence pairs were constructed: 
a) a pair in which Sl was ambiguous and S2 disambiguated the first 
according to the expected (more probable) meaning of the ambiguity; 
b) one in which the ambiguous Sl was disambiguated by S2 according 
to its unexpected (less probable) meaning; c) a control pair in which 
Sl was minimally altered to express unambiguously the more probable 
meaning and conjoined to the expected S2; and d) a control pair in 
which Sl was minimally altered to express unambiguously the less 
probable meaning and conjoined with the unexpected second sentence 
~. 338). As in the earlier study, each S was to decide whether the 
two sentences of the pair went together by pushing a yes or no button. 
The results of the 1973 study showed that highly biased ambiguous 
sentences associated with unexpected sentences had longer latencies 
than unambiguous sentences paired with unexpected sentences. A 
similar effect was not found for the unbiased sentences. Pairs 
containing highly biased ambiguous sentences paired with expected 
sentences revealed the same latencies as for similar unambiguous 
sentences. 
Cairns then hypothesized two processing stages intervening 
between the end of the second sentence and the button pushing of the 
judgment task. The first stage was hypothesized to be a matching 
stage during which the ~ compared the two sentences by some sort of 
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matching strategy. During the second stage or report stage the ~ 
used the information from the first stage and made a compatibility 
judgment concerning the two sentences. A third stage or reprocessing 
stage was hypothesized to occur when the matching operation not only 
yielded a mismatch but also a misperception of the ambiguity in the 
first sentence. This stage, which was hypothesized to occur between 
the matching and report stage, involved a computation of a second, 
compatible meaning. 
Summary. Previous studies have attempted to specify the 
processes underlying sentence comprehension. Various experimental 
designs have been proposed as ways of determining the relative in-
fluence of deep and surface structure. Two of the more important 
methods in the study of sentence processing have been the use of 
perception and verification latencies with ambiguous sentences. 
MacKay (1966) found increasing perception time with increasing 
complexity of ambiguity. Foss (1970b) used a phoneme-monitor task 
to investigate the effect of ambiguity on sentence comprehension. He 
found that reaction time was slower following the ambiguous material. 
Other studies (cf. Cairns, 1971, 1973; Carey, Mehler, & Bever, 
1970; Foss, Bever, & Silver, 1970) have found that bias and S 
expectancy result in longer processing latencies. Mistler-Lachman 
(1972) found that with certain tasks, underlying structural ambiguity 
has shown the longest latencies when compared with other types of 
ambiguity. 
The relationship between latency and levels of ambiguity has 
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served to verify empirically a psycholinguistic model of deep and 
surface structure processing. It has also led to the development 
of several models of linguistic processing and different cognitive 
structuring (e.g., Language Comprehension Device} which specifically 
dealt with the language function. 
However, several important considerations have not been fully 
accounted for by previous studies. Firstly, Mistler-Lachman stated 
that previous studies failed to control for levels of comprehension. 
In the meaningfulness judgment the ~ was told to imagine a situation 
in which the presented sentence might mean something. The meaning-
fulness judgment alone was found to be inadequate for the study of 
deep level comprehension of ambiguous sentences since the Ss were 
not required to process the meaning of the entire sentence. 
What, then, might be a task which not only requires the S to 
judge the meaningfulness of the sentence, but also actively to 
interpret the meaning of the sentence? A procedure which would force 
the ~ actively to search for a meaning or meanings of a sentence could 
eliminate the shallowness of comprehension noted by Mistler-Lachman 
(1972). The shallowness was said to result from the failure to fully 
comprehend the meaning of the sentence. 
Secondly, previous research has not specified sublevels of 
semantic ambiguity. Specifically, those studies which have tested for 
the processing of lexical ambiguity have not distinguished between 
simple and complex lexical ambiguity. In MacKay and Bever (1967) 
simple lexical ambiguity was defined as the specification of the 
i. 
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referent to only one word of the sentence. Complex lexical ambiguity 
was defined as ambiguity involving a phrase or constituent of a 
sentence whose resolution determines the meaning of the entire 
sentence. For example, the sentence: On top of everything there was 
a tarpaulin. involves ambiguity in the sentence constituent, on top 
of everything. Only by specifying the complex relationship of this 
phrase to the entire sentence can the ambiguity be resolved. Due 
to the difference in the underlying complexity of the semantic 
ambiguity, differences in processing or recognition time would be 
expected for each type of sentence. MacKay and Bever (1967) have 
viewed lexical ambiguity as a unitary phenomenon. The question re-
mains whether processing time would vary if the distinction were made 
between simple and complex lexical ambiguity. 
Cue versus non-cue. The issue of ~ cueing in the processing 
of ambiguous sentences has been almost a non-issue up to the present 
time. No ~has specifically tested the effect of cue versus non-cue 
on ambiguous sentence processing. 
The one-meaning interpretation hypothesis was clearly predicted 
on the Ss' lack of awareness of the ambiguity in the experimental 
sentences. This hypothesis would not be applicable to those experi-
ments in which the Ss expected ambiguous test sentences. The assign-
ment of one meaning to a sentence would be probable only if the S 
were not actively searching for ambiguity. 
Despite the apparent need for a separation of the cue versus 
non-cue condition of experimental ambiguity, studies have failed to 
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take into account ~s' expectations of ambiguity in the experimental 
materials. It is important, then, to separate the findings of Cairns 
(1971, 1973) and Mistler-Lachman (1972) who did not cue the Ss into 
expecting ambiguous sentences and those studies which specifically 
informed the Ss they were to be presented with ambiguous sentence 
materials (Carey, Mehler, & Bever, 1970; MacKay & Bever, 1967). In 
the former instance the E presumably investigated ambiguous sentence 
processing under the more natural conditions of non-cue or non-
expectation of finding sentence ambiguity. The latter studies examined 
ambiguous sentence processing under more artificial conditions in which 
the ~s were told that they would be presented with sentences which 
could have more than one meaning. 
Different latencies would be predicted because of the differ-
ences in the Ss' expectations. Such latency variations were obtained 
(cf. Mistler-Lachman, 1972) but were not related to the effect of 
instructing~ prior to the experimental task. The Ss' expectations 
of ambiguity or non-ambiguity appears to be a pertinent variable if 
a viable perception model of sentence processing is to be developed. 
The purpose of the present study was then to: 1) clarify the 
interrelationship or interaction between types of ambiguity and time 
to process under cue and non-cue conditions; 2) verify the differences 
in perceptual processing time between simple and complex lexical 
ambiguity; and 3) analyze omission errors committed by the S when 
he failed to resolve the ambiguity. 
The following hypotheses were then offered: 
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1. For both the meaning judgment task and the picture 
verification task, increased PT latencies will be a function of 
increased complexity of ambiguity. 
a) Ambiguous sentences will require longer time to process than 
non-ambiguous sentences. 
b) Underlying syntactic structure ambiguity will require longer 
time to process than surface syntactic structure ambiguity. 
c) Sentences with complex lexical ambiguity will require longer 
time to process than sentences with simple lexical ambiguity. 
2. ~s not cued to the presence of ambiguity in the sentences 
prior to the picture verification task will commit more omission 
errors. 
3. Ss in the cue condition will show significantly longer 
process latencies in both tasks than those in the non-cue condition. 
Two tasks were proposed to test these hypotheses: 1) a meaning 
judgment; and 2) a picture verification task. It was proposed that a 
picture verification task would reveal resolution of either one or 
both of the meanings of the sentence. 
Five sentence types were tested: unambiguous, syntactic 
surface structure ambiguous sentences, underlying syntactic structure 
ambiguous sentences, simple lexically ambiguous sentences, and complex 
lexically ambiguous sentences. Surface ambiguous sentences were 
defined as sentences whose meaning is resolved by the rearrangement 
of the surface structure components. Deep structure, or underlying, 
ambiguous sentences were defined as sentences whose meaning is resolved 
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by the different interpretation of linguistic strings hypothesized 
to underlie the surface structure. Simple lexical ambiguity was 
defined as the specification of the referent to only one word of 
the sentence. Complex lexical ambiguity was defined as ambiguity 
involving a phrase or constituent of more than one word, whose 
resolution determines the meaning of the entire sentence. 
Finally, the omission errors were recorded in order to reveal 
whether there was a predominance of single meaning perception in a 
non-cue condition, or a complete resolution of the sentence meanings. 
The ineffectiveness of the meaningfulness task in the Mistler-Lachman 
(1972) study might have been a function of the level of S awareness 
of ambiguity and not the task as such. The present study differed 
from Mistler-Lachman (1972) in: 1) cueing half of the Ss to the 
ambiguity; and 2) giving the Ss a task (meaning judgment) which would 
induce full comprehension of the sentence meaning. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
subjects 
A total of 60 Ss participated in the experiment, some in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement, and some as volunteers 
from undergraduate classes at Loyola University of Chicago. An 
equal number of males and females were evenly divided into two 
conditions of cue and non-cue. The primary restrictions on the Ss 
were that they be native speakers of English and at least second 
generation Americans. 
Materials 
The 50 sentences used were taken from the Mistler-Lachman 
(1972} dissertation. Appendix B contains the experimental sentences. 
The categories for the sources of ambiguity were taken from the same 
source with the exception of the lexically ambiguous sentences. 
Mistler-Lachman presented the lexically ambiguous sentences under one 
category. Simple lexical sentences were defined as those sentences 
in which the referent of a single word was in question. Complex :.I 
lexical ambiguity was defined as those sentences in which the referent 
of a word determined whether the meaning of a whole phrase or the 
meaning of a whole sentence was ambiguous. Measurements of temporal 
latency were taken to 1/lOOth of a second. The sentences were counter-
balanced for length and embedding. Percentage of bias was randomly 
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distributed throughout all sentence categories. 
Five types of sentences were presented: non-ambiguous, 
surface structure ambiguous, simple lexical ambiguous, complex 
lexical ambiguous, and syntactically ambiguous. Of the SO sentences 
.presented, 10 sentences, or two from each category, were used for 
practice sentences and were not included in the final statistical 
analysis. Following the presentation of the first 10 sentences, 40 
sentences were presented, randomly arranged according to non-ambiguous, 
ambiguous, and types of ambiguity. 
Four pictures followed each sentence. The pictures were cartoon 
caricatures which depicted the single or double meaning of the test 
sentences (correct) and two or three foils related to the theme of the 
test sentence (incorrect). The pictures were judged previous to the 
actual experiment for quality and consistency by three Ss. Appendix 
C contains a sample of the pictures used in the experiment. The Ss 
were told the meaning(s) of the test sentences and asked to choose 
the pictures which visually represented the meaning(s) of the 
sentence. No errors of mismatching for any type of sentence and 
picture were found among the three Ss. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus for the study included a Kodak carousel pro-
jector, a BRS/LVE print-out counter and a BRS/LVE pulse generator 
which measured the temporal latencies in 1/lOOth of a second. A 
hand-operated button changed the slides and also served as a mechanical 
means for indicating meaning judgment and termination of the picture 
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judgment. A small rear-projection screen was used which was divided 
into four quadrants A, B, C, and D. The target sentences were 
presented in the center of the screen and the four pictures for the 
picture verification tasks were presented simultaneously, one each in 
each of the four quadrants. The position of the correct pictures 
was counterbalanced for each of the four areas of the screen. 
Procedure 
The Ss were taken individually to an experimental booth and 
seated in front of a small projection screen. Each was asked to read 
along as tbe E read the following instruction: 
Cue Condition 
A series of sentences will be projected onto the screen in 
front of you. You will be asked to look at each sentence 
and to press the button in front of you when you have deter-
mined the meaning of the sentence. Now some of the sentences 
you see can have more than one meaning. For example, the 
sentence: The boy stood near the deck., can mean the boy 
stood near the deck of a ship or near a deck of cards. Make 
sure you see all the possible meanings of the sentence before 
you press the button. Following the judgment of the sentence 
meaning, a series of four pictures will be projected on the 
screen in front of you. You are to look at the pictures and 
choose those which visually show the meaning of the previously 
presented sentence. You are to indicate your choice by calling 
out the letter of the quadrant containing the picture or 
pictures you have chosen. When you have made your final choice 
press the button again and another sentence will appear. You 
will then follow the same procedure. You will continue this 
procedure for a total of 50 sentences. Are there any questions? 
Non-cue Condition 
The instructions were the same as those given in the cue 
condition with the exception that no mention was made of sentence 
ambiguity. Instead, an example of a non-ambiguous sentence was used 
when the S was instructed to determine the meaning of the sentence. 
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The non-cue condition instructions were the following: 
A series of sentences will be projected onto the screen in 
front of you. You will be asked to look at each sentence 
and to press the button in front of you when you have deter-
mined the meaning of the sentence. You might see a sentence 
like the following: They are removing the boxes. This 
sentence might mean that a group of people were removing 
assorted boxes from a room for example. Make sure you see 
all the possible meanings of the sentence before you press 
the button. Following the judgment of the sentence meaning, 
a series of four pictures will be projected on the screen 
in front of you. You are to look at the pictures and choose 
those which visually show the meaning of the previously 
presented sentence. You are to indicate your choice by 
calling out the letter of the quadrant containing the picture 
or pictures you have chosen. When you have made your final 
choice press the button again and another sentence will 
appear. You will then follow the same procedure. You will 
continue this procedure for a total of 50 sentences. Are 
there any questions? 
Following the instructions, the first sentence was projected 
on the screen. Coincidental with the projection, the timer was 
automatically activated. The timer gave a cumulative recording of 
the latencies each time the S pressed the button indicating he had 
determined the meaning of the sentence or had terminated the 
picture search. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Three types of data analyses were carried out: two three-way 
analyses of variance on the meaning judgment and picture verification 
latencies, and a two-way analysis of variance for omission errors. 
The analysis of variance for the latencies was a one within subject 
factor and a two between subject factor design for repeated measures. 
The within subject factor was sentence type and the between factors 
were gender and cue condition. The analysis for the meaning judgment 
1, 
was computed on eight sentences within each type. Sentences within 
type was considered a fixed factor. The analysis for the picture 
verification condition was computed on the pictures for eight 
I' 
sentences within five types. The mean perceptual latencies, in 
seconds, were taken for all sentence types across all conditions, and 
used as the input for the analyses. 
The mean perceptual processing latencies for the two tasks 
appear in Table 1. The latencies for the meaning judgment revealed 
longest PTs for surface and underlying syntactic ambiguous sentences, 
and shortest PTs for the two lexically ambiguous sentences with the 
unambiguous sentences showing shorter PTs than syntactic and longer 
than lexical ambiguity. The latencies for the picture verification 
condition revealed longer PT for all types of ambiguous sentences 
when compared with the unambiguous sentences. 
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Table 1 
Mean Latencies (in Seconds) for Perception Time to Process the 
Sentence Types in the Sentence Meaning Judgment Task 
Unambiguous Surface 
5.61 5.92 
Under-
lying 
5.92 
Simple 
Lexical 
5.25 
Complex 
Lexical 
5.23 
Mean Latencies (in Seconds) for Perception Time to Process the 
Type 
Sentence Types in the Picture Verification Task 
Unambiguous Surface 
9.86 11.25 
Under-
lying 
12.00 
Simple 
Lexical 
10.52 
Complex 
Lexical 
11.19 
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Meaning Judgment 
Results of the meaning judgment appear in Table 2. Two effects 
were significant: that for between sentence types, grouped ambiguous 
and unambiguous, F (4, 224) = 9.97, £ < .001, and that for sentences 
within type, F (35, 1960) = 10.04, p < .001. The latter effect in-
dicated an unequal degree of difficulty among the sentences within 
type, probably due to different degrees of bias randomly distributed 
among the sentences. 
Neither cueing nor gender were significant effects. Cueing 
did not significantly increase perception time latencies for ambiguous 
sentences. The Cue x Type interaction was almost significant at the 
.OS level. The mean perceptual latencies of this interaction are 
summarized in Table 3. 
The cue condition resulted in longer, although nonsignificant 
latencies for all sentence types when compared with the non-cue 
condition. In the cue condition, unambiguous, surface and underlying 
syntax sentence types showed almost identical PTs. The simple and 
complex lexical sentences had shorter perceptual latencies than any 
of the other three types. The non-cue condition resulted in longer 
latencies for the surface and underlying syntax sentences versus the 
unambiguous sentences. The unambiguous, simple lexical and complex 
lexical latencies were almost identical. The results of the Cue x 
Type interaction are graphically summarized in Figure 1. 
Two further analyses of the data were computed. A series of 
planned orthogonal comparisons were formulated for the significant 
-~~---- ----------------
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Table 2 
Three-Way Analysis of Variance for a One Within Factor, Two Between 
Factor Repeated Measures Design. Within Factor = Sentence 
Type, Between Factors = Cue and Gender 
Source Error ss df MS F p 
Mean P(CG} 74981.38 1 74981.38 906.96 
C* P(CG} 214.98 1 214.98 2.60 N.S. 
G* P(CG} 226.84 1 226.84 2.74 N.S. 
T* PT(CG} 221.49 4 55.37 9.97 < .001 
S (T} * PS(CGT} 1592.13 35 45.49 10.04 < .001 
CG (PCG} 60.77 1 60.77 0.74 N.S. 
CT PT(CG} 52.46 4 13.12 2.36 < .10 
GT PT(CG} 6.76 4 1.69 0.30 N.S. 
P(CG}* 4629.68 56 82.67 
CS (T} PS (CGT} 178.57 35 5.10 1.13 N.S. 
GS(T} PS(CGT} 147.55 35 4.22 0.93 N.S. 
CGT PT(CG} 18.02 4 4.50 0.81 N.S. 
PT(CG} 1244.00 224 5.55 
CGS(T} PS(CGT} 152.34 35 4.35 0.96 N.S. 
PS(CGT} 8878.94 1960 4.53 
*C =cue and non-cue, G =gender (male and female}, T =sentence type, 
S = sentence, P = people or subjects 
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Table 3 
Mean Latencies (in Seconds) for the Sentence Type X Cue 
Interaction--Meaning Judgment 
Unambiguous Surface 
6.18 6.14 
5.06 5.70 
Under-
lying 
6.21 
5.63 
Simple 
Lexical 
5.37 
5.14 
Complex 
Lexical 
5.54 
4.93 
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SENTENCE TYPES 
Figure 1. Latency in seconds to perform meaning 
judgment tasks on sentences containing 
different types of ambiguity--cue x 
sentence type interaction. 
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effect of sentence types. These analyses were needed to measure the 
locus of significant differences between the ambiguous and unambiguous 
sentences. A least significant difference comparison was also com-
puted for each ambiguous sentence type versus the unambiguous sentence 
type. Results of the orthogonal comparisons are summarized in 
Table 4.- Two comparisons were non-significant and three were 
significant. The PT for ambiguous sentences combined did not differ 
significantly from the PT for the non-ambiguous category, as noted in 
line ~of Table 4. And, a non-significant difference was also found 
between the simple and complex lexically ambiguous sentences as in 
line d of Table 4. 
Three significant effects were found in the comparisons 
summarized in Table 4. The perceptual time latency for the surface 
syntactic ambiguity differed significantly from the combined latencies 
for the underlying syntactic and lexical ambiguity, as noted in line 
b. Additionally, line £of Table 4 reveals that the PT latency for 
the underlying syntactic category was significantly longer than the 
combined latencies for both lexically ambiguous sentence types. The 
most important finding is summarized in line e of Table 4. The com-
- bined perceptual processing times for the surface and underlying 
syntactically ambiguous sentences were significantly different from 
the combined processing times of the simple and complex lexically 
ambiguous sentences. An examination of Table 1 reveals that the 
syntactically-based sentences had longer latencies than the lexically-
based sentences. 
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Table 4 
Planned Orthogonal Comparisons for Effect of Sentence Type 
in the Analysis of Variance for Sentence 
Meaning Judgment Latency 
Sentence Unambiguous Surface Underlying Simple Complex 
Type a. +4 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
b. +3 
-1 
-1 
-1 
c. 
+2 
-1 
-1 
d. 
+1 
-1 
e • 0 +1 +1 
-1 
-1 
a. t = • 28 p = N.S. 
b. t = 3.63 ~< .01 
c. t = 5.16 p < .01 
d. t = .14 ~= N.S. 
e. t = 6.31 
.e_< .01 
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As noted in Table 2 a significant effect was found for 
sentence type. The orthogonal comparison in line e of Table 4 also 
revealed a significant difference between the surface and underlying 
syntactic versus simple and complex lexical types. A least 
significant difference comparison was computed to determine a differ-
ence between each ambiguous type and the unambiguous sentence 
category. The results are summarized in Table 5. The data revealed 
that the ambiguous sentence perceptual processing latencies were 
significantly different from the latencies for the non-ambiguous 
sentences. The mean latencies summarized in Table 2 combined with 
the results in Table 5 revealed that the surface and underlying 
syntactic sentences each took significantly longer to process than 
the non-ambiguous sentences. The lexically ambiguous sentences each 
took significantly less time to process than the non-ambiguous 
sentences. 
In summary, for the meaning judgment task the following order ~~~~ 
:.li 
,I 
'il of increasing PT latency was found: 1) lexically ambiguous 
sentences, with no difference between simple and complex; 2) non-
ambiguous sentences; and, 3) syntactically ambiguous sentences, with 
no difference between surface and underlying complexity. No 
significant effects appeared for sex differences or cued and non-cued 
condition. 
Picture Verification 
Two analyses were computed for the data in the picture 
verification condition. The data were the times to perceptually 
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Table S 
Least Significant Difference Comparisons for Pairs of 
Sentence Types--Sentence Meaning Judgment Latency 
Types 
Unambiguous vs. Surface t = 2.00 E_< .OS 
Unambiguous vs. Syntactic t = 2.01 E_< .OS 
Unambiguous vs. Simple Lexical t = 2.38 E_< .02 
Unambiguous vs. Complex Lexical t = 2.S2 E_< .02 
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process the pictures or sketches following each sentence. These 
data were measured in seconds. The two analyses were: 1) an analysis 
of variance for the perceptual processing latencies, and 2) a series 
of planned orthogonal comparisons. 
The results of the analysis of variance are summarized in 
Table 6. A comparison of the results between Table 2 and Table 6 
revealed complete consistency between the analyses of variance for 
the two experimental tasks. In both analyses, that for the m~aning 
judgment condition (Table 2), and that for the picture verification 
task (Table 6) the same effects were significant. The first effect 
was for sentence type, the second for within sentences of the same 
type. In the picture verification task for sentence type, F (4, 224) 
= 8.2, £ < .001. For sketches within type, F (35, 1960) = 6.84, 
,i li 
£ < .001. Although the sentences and sketches were not identical 
materials they were analogously related. Both sentences and sketches 
showed variability in level of difficulty within each type of sentence 
category related to different bias percentages. This confirmed a 
similar finding in the meaning judgment condition. No significant 
effects were found for either cue, gender, or the Cue x Type inter-
action. 
Given the significant effect of sentence type, a series of 
planned orthogonal comparisons were computed for the ambiguous and 
non-ambiguous sentences. The data are summarized in Table 7. Of 
the five comparisons, three were significant and two were non-
significant. These results were not identical with the orthogonal 
44 
Table 6 
Three-Way Analysis of Variance for a One Within Factor, Two Between 
Factor Repeated Measures Design. Within Factor = Sentence 
Type, Between Factors = Cue and Gender. 
Source Error ss df MS F 
Mean P(CG) 288490.40 1 288490.40 565.00 
C* P(CG) 346.26 1 346.26 0.68 N.S. 
G* P(CG) 113.71 1 113.71 0.22 N.S. 
T* PT(CG) 1256.17 4 314.04 8.12 < .001 
S(T)* PS(CGT) 5333.42 35 152.38 6.84 < .001 
CG P(CG) 432.19 1 432.19 0.85 N.S. 
CT PT(CG) 152.44 4 38.11 0.98 N.S. 
GT PT(CG) 116.23 4 29.06 0.75 N.S. 
P (CG) * 28593.73 56 510.60 
CS(T) PS(CGT) 641.17 35 18.32 0.82 N.S. 
GS(T) PS(CGT) 920.40 35 26.30 1.18 N.S. 
CGT PT(CG) 299.85 4 74.96 1.94 N.S. 
PT(CG) 8665.23 224 38.68 
CGS(T) PS(CGT) 841.29 35 24.04 1.08 N.S. 
PS(CGT) 43672.68 1960 22.28 
*C =cue and non-cue, G =gender (male and female), T =sentence type, 
S = sentence, P = people or subjects 
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Table 7 
Planned Orthogonal Comparisons for Effect of Sentence Type 
in the Analysis of Variance for Picture Verification Task 
Sentence Unambiguous Surface Underlying Simple Complex 
Type a. +4 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
b. +3 
-1 
-1 
-1 
c. +2 
-1 
-1 
d. 
+1 
-1 
e. 0 +1 +1 
-1 
-1 
a. t = 4.35 E_< .01 
b. t = .05 E_= N.S. 
c. t = 3.28 E_< .01 
d. t = 1.19 E_= N.S. 
e. t = 2.70 E_< .01 
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comparisons for the meaning judgment. This indicated that although 
both analyses of variance showed the same variables to differ 
significantly, the source of the significance was different for the 
two tasks. 
Consistent with Table 4 are the results summarized in lines 
£t ~, and e of Table 7. The latency for the underlying sentences 
versus the combined latencies of the lexically ambiguous sentences 
were significant. These data are analyzed in line c of Table 7. 
An examination of the means in Table 1 for the picture verification 
task revealed a longer latency for the underlying syntactic ambiguity 
than either of the latencies for the lexically ambiguous sentences. 
The second consistent result is summarized in lined of Table 7. The 
latencies between simple and complex lexically ambiguous sentences 
were not significantly different. The third consistent result is 
summarized in line e of Table 7. A significant difference was found 
between the syntactically-based sentences and the lexically-based 
sentences. Combining the information in Table 1 with the result in 
line~, Table 7, the syntactically-based sentences had longer per-
ceptual processing latencies than the lexical-type of ambiguity. 
Inconsistent with the results in Table 4 are the data in lines 
a and b of Table 7. In line a, the combined latencies for the 
ambiguous sentences were significantly different from the unambiguous 
sentences. The results from the verification task as well as the 
meaning judgment task, summarized in Table 1, showed that the mean 
latencies for the ambiguous sentences in the verification task were 
47 
longer than the mean latency for the unambiguous sentences. The 
longer latencies for the ambiguous sentences than for the unambiguous 
sentences in the picture verification task were partially due to the 
demands of the task. The ambiguous sentences required the S to 
choose two pictures and the unambiguous sentences only one picture. 
Logically, more time is required to choose two pictures than one. 
The second inconsistent result is summarized in line b, 
Table 7. The surface syntactic latencies did not differ significantly 
from the combined latencies of the other unambiguous types. The in-
consistent result was due to the relative increase in the mean 
latencies for lexically ambiguous sentences in the picture 
verification task. 
Omission Errors 
In the picture verification condition, it had been hypothesized 
that the non-cue condition would produce more omission errors than the 
cue condition. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that prior 
awareness of ambiguity was necessary for complete resolution of an 
ambiguous sentence. Without this awareness, a failure to choose or 
"find" the second picture was expected. The analysis of omission 
errors was necessary, then, as a measure of the prevalence of single 
meaning perception, especially in the non-cue condition. 
A specific type of omission was chosen to analyze response 
characteristics in the cue versus non-cue condition. Omission errors 
were defined as the failure to select one appropriate picture in 
conjunction with a single correct choice. An example is the 
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following: The crowd gathered to see the star. This sentence is 
ambiguous on the simple lexical level. An omission error was com-
mitted when one correct picture was chosen, e.g., a picture of a 
crowd viewing a celestial body, but the second correct picture was 
not chosen, e.g., a picture of a crowd gathering to see a movie 
star. This type of error represented the instance where the S 
perceived a single meaning of the sentence and failed to resolve 
the ambiguity. 
The results of the analysis of variance on errors are 
summarized in Table 8. The main effects were cue versus non-cue and 
male versus female. Gender was studied to determine if the non-
difference between male and female in process times for meaning 
judgment and picture verification tasks also held for omission errors. 
For cue, ~ {1, 56) = 8.90, £ < .005, and for gender, ~ {1, 56) = .59, 
£ = NS. The Cue x Gender interaction was non-significant, ! {1, 56) 
= .11, £ = NS. The mean number of omission errors for the cue 
condition was 10.10 and 16.03 for the non-cue condition. This finding 
in conjunction with the analysis of variance for omission errors 
showed significantly more errors in the non-cue condition than in the 
cue condition. 
In order to eliminate the possibility that the Ss in the non-
cue condition were unaware of the necessity of choosing two pictures 
if two correct pictures were present, all Ss were questioned following 
the final sentence presentation. All of the ~s reported that they 
had understood the instructions to choose two pictures if two 
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Table 8 
Two-Way Analysis of Variance for Omission Errors. Omission 
Errors for Analysis were Defined as a Single Omission 
Error in Conjunction With One Correct Response 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 3891.73 59 
Cue 528.06 1 528.06 8.90 < .005 
Gender 35.26 1 35.26 .59 N.S. 
Cue X Gender 6.68 1 6.68 .11 N.S. 
Error 3321.73 56 59.32 
so 
meanings were present. 
Random samplings of approximately 15 Ss in the non-cue 
condition gave some clue as to the comprehension process following 
the picture verification stage. The Ss in the non-cue condition fell 
into two distinct categories. Approximately 8 ~s reported actively 
failing to choose the second meaning of some sentences explaining 
that the second "less-biased" meaning was rejected as being improbable. 
This response pattern prevailed despite an understanding by the ss 
of the necessity of choosing two pictures if they recognized two 
meanings. A second category of ~s reported a failure to recognize 
the second meaning in most of the experimental sentences despite the 
fact that 80% of the sentences were ambiguous. These Ss lent tentative 
support to the one-meaning hypothesis (cf. Foss, Bever, & Silver, 1968; 
Carey, Mehler, & Bever, 1970) discussed above, which contended that 
one meaning of an ambiguous sentence is immediately perceived without 
interference from the other meaning. 
Summary 
In summary, the following hypotheses were offered with the 
corresponding results: 
1) For both the meaning judgment task and the picture 
verification task, increased latencies of recognition were hypothesized 
to be a function of increased complexity of ambiguity. This hypothesis 
was partially confirmed. Longest latencies occurred in the processing 
of underlying syntactic ambiguity in both tasks. However, in the 
meaning judgment task the shorter latencies in both lexical categories 
:I 
:'1', Ill 
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were not predicted. 
la) Ambiguous sentences will require longer time to process 
than non-ambiguous sentences. This hypothesis was partially 
confirmed in the meaning judgment task and completely con-
formed in the picture verification task. In the meaning 
judgment task only the syntactically-based ambiguous 
sentences showed longer latencies than the unambiguous 
sentences. The lexically based sentences showed significantly 
shorter latencies than the unambiguous sentence types. 
lb) Underlying syntactic structure ambiguity will require longer 
time to process than surface syntactic ambiguity. Although 
the picture verification task showed latencies in the 
hypothesized direction, neither task showed a significant 
difference between the underlying and surface syntactic 
ambiguity in time to process. 
lc) Sentences with complex lexical ambiguity will require longer 
time to process than sentences with simple lexical ambiguity. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed in either of the 
experimental tasks although the picture verification task 
showed latencies in the hypothesized direction. 
2) The Ss not-cued to the presence of ambiguity in the 
sentences prior to the experimental task will commit more omission 
errors. Statistical confirmation was found for this hypothesis. 
More errors were found in the non-cue than cue condition. 
3) The Ss in the cue condition will show significantly longer 
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processing latencies in both tasks than those in the non-cue 
condition. No significant differences were found in the latencies 
for the cue and non-cue conditions, although the latencies were in 
the direction hypothesized. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The discussion of the data is divided into three general 
considerations: 1) a comparison of the present results with the 
results of prior studies; 2) an explanation of the present results; 
and, 3) an interpretation of these results. The first two con-
siderations are discussed in terms of the meaning judgment task, 
the picture verification task, cue condition latencies, omission 
errors, meaning versus meaningfulness, and linguistic processing 
models. An interpretation of the data is discussed in terms of a 
compromise model. 
A brief review of the types of ambiguity and experimental 
tasks precedes the discussion. The sentence materials were of 
five types: unambiguous, surface structure syntactic ambiguous, 
deep structure syntactic ambiguous, simple and complex lexical 
ambiguous sentences. Surface ambiguous sentences were defined as 
sentences whose meaning is resolved by the rearrangement of the 
surface structure components or by a second constituent analysis of 
the surface structure of the sentence. Deep structure ambiguous 
sentences were defined as sentences whose meaning is resolved by an 
understanding of possible strings which are hypothesized to underlie 
the surface structure. Simple lexical ambiguity was defined as the 
specification of the referent to only one word of the sentence. 
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complex lexical ambiguity was defined as ambiguity involving a phrase 
or constituent of a sentence whose resolution determines the meaning 
of the entire sentence. 
The Ss in this experiment read the sentences and performed 
the following tasks: 1} in a meaning judgment the Ss pressed a 
button when they understood the meaning of the sentence; 2} in a 
picture verification task the Ss chose the picture or pictures which 
gave a visual explanation of the previously shown sentence. The ~s, 
one-half of whom were male and one-half of whom were female, performed 
these tasks under two conditions: 1} half were alerted to possible 
ambiguity in the task (cue condition}; and 2} the other half were 
not (non-cue condition}. The major variables of the study, then, 
were types of ambiguity, cueing, and gender. 
Types of Ambiguity: Meaning Judgment 
In the meaning judgment task the unambiguous sentence latencies 
were significantly different from the latencies for the ambiguous 
sentences. Both the surface syntactic and underlying syntactic 
sentences required significantly longer processing times than the 
unambiguous types, but underlying syntactic ambiguity demanded no 
longer time to process than that for surface structure. Both lexically 
ambiguous categories showed shorter latencies than the unambiguous 
sentences, but again showed no latency difference between lexical 
types. 
The above results were derived from the combined latencies of 
the cue and non-cue conditions. As previously noted, in the Cue x 
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Type interaction, the syntactically-based ambiguous sentences had 
longer latencies than the unambiguous sentences only in the non-cue 
condition. The simple lexical and complex lexical latencies were 
shorter than the unambiguous sentence latencies only in the cue 
condition. In both instruction conditions, however, the syntactically-
based ambiguous sentences showed longer times to process than the 
lexically-based ambigious sentences. 
Figure 2 represents the effect of type of ambiguity on 
processing time. Contrary to MacKay (1966) not all of the ambiguous 
sentences resulted in longer latencies as a function of level of 
complexity. The lexically ambiguous sentences not only did not yield 
longer latencies when compared with the unambiguous category, but 
rather showed significantly shorter perception times than the 
unambiguous sentences. 
Mistler-Lachman (1972) found that a meaningfulness judgment 
without context produced no significant differences in perceptual 
latencies between unambiguous and ambiguous sentences. When context 
was provided for the meaningfulness judgment, surface syntactic 
ambiguity required a significantly longer time than the unambiguous, 
syntactic underlying, or lexical types. No significant differences 
were found in the latencies between the latter three categories. 
Mistler-Lachman's results, however, did not reflect the full compre-
hension of the sentence meaning. The failure to comprehend the 
sentence could have resulted in a failure to resolve the ambiguity. 
Using a different task these results were not confirmed in the present 
I' 
I 
en 
c 
z 
0 
'0 
w 
en 
z 
w 
:E 
... 
z 
0 
... 
~ 
w 
0 
I a: w 
l ~ ' 
I I 
6,oo 
5.75 
5.50 
5.25 
56 
UNAMB. SURF. UNDER. SIM. 
LEX. 
SENTENCE TYPES 
- -
Figure 2. Latency in seconds to perform meaning 
judgment tasks on sentences containing 
different types of ambiguity. 
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study. In a meaning judgment, without context, the present study 
showed a significant difference between the ambiguous and unambiguous 
sentences. As noted above, the surface structure did require longer 
processing time in relation to the single-meaning sentences, but 
underlying syntactic sentences also required longer latencies than 
lexical or unambiguous sentences. Therefore, in using a meaningful-
ness judgment Mistler-Lachman was not testing the effect of ambiguity 
on sentence processing. Her task allowed the S to make a judgment 
without completely processing the sentence. 
Foss (1971), using a phoneme-monitoring task, also found no 
differences between lexical and deep syntactic ambiguity. The longer 
latencies for surface syntactic and deep structure ambiguity versus 
simple and complex lexical ambiguity in the present study were 
contrary to Foss' results. 
The present study confirmed in part the results of MacKay and 
Bever (1967). They found that perception time for lexical ambiguity 
was shorter than that for surface structure ambiguity, but their 
longest latencies were obtained for the underlying syntactic ambiguity. 
Although, in the present study, deep structure syntactic ambiguity 
required the longest time to process of all the sentence types no 
significant differences were found between this type and the surface 
syntactic structure ambiguity. Lexical ambiguity showed the shortest 
latencies among ambiguous sentences in the MacKay and Bever (1967) 
study. These latencies, however, were not significantly shorter than 
those for unambiguous sentences as found in the present study. 
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The following results need to be explained: 1) the shorter 
perception time in the lexically ambiguous categories than in the 
unambiguous sentences. No previous studies reported this finding. 
2) The identical latencies for the underlying and surface ambiguity. 
In previous studies the relative perception time for surface structure 
has fluctuated depending on the task. 3) The identical latencies for 
the simple and complex lexical categories. No previous studies 
have made this distinction. 
!ypes of Ambiguity: Picture Verification 
The picture verification task revealed data similar in some 
respects to the meaning judgment task but with specific differences 
requiring a more comprehensive explanation. Figure 3 shows the 
effect of ambiguity on picture verification times. The present data 
argued against Mistler-Lachman's (1972) criticisms of MacKay's (1966) 
data. MacKay found the following order of processing times: 
unambiguous, lexical, syntactic surface, and underlying syntactic. 
The present study provided tentative support for MacKay's data as 
presented in Figure 4. Discounting the complex lexical category 
which was not used in MacKay's study, the curve for the present study 
was similar in configuration to the MacKay (1966) study. In the 
present study, significant differences were not found between all 
ambiguity categories. 
Mistler-Lachman (1972) questioned MacKay's results primarily 
on the basis of methodology. She criticized the imprecision of 
stop-watches to measure latency. The completion times in the MacKay 
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verification tasks on sentences containing 
different types of ambiguity. 
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study included the reaction time of the E in starting and stopping 
the watch, the time to flip over an index card, the time to read 
the fragment silently, the time to think of a completion, the time 
to read the fragment aloud, and the time to speak the completion 
aloud. 
Although possibly valid for MacKay's methodology, Mistler-
Lachman's criticisms of the MacKay study do not apply to the method-
ology of the present study. The present study used a picture 
verification task in place of the production without context of 
MacKay (1966} and Mistler-Lachman (1972}. The picture verification 
task was under the complete control of the ~ who pressed a button 
when he made his final choice. The task then measured time to recall 
the sentence, time to scan the pictures, time to verbalize the 
picture choices, and time to press the button. The reaction time 
measurement was entirely automatic thus eliminating a major portion 
of the Mistler-Lachman criticism. Given the precision of the present 
methodology, MacKay's findings of differential processing times 
relative to levels of ambiguity seem more valid than Mistler-
Lachman's findings of no difference. 
Cue Conditions: Omission Errors 
A discussion of the data from the omission errors must 
necessarily consider the non-significant difference found between 
latencies in the cue and non-cue conditions. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, the cue condition did not reveal longer latencies than 
the non-cue condition. The longer latencies were hypothesized as 
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a result of an active search process for ambiguity. 
Of interest to the present study was the effect of prior 
cueing on the response patterning during the picture verification 
task. It was specifically hypothesized that Ss in the non-cue 
, I 
I! condition would have a tendency to produce single responses on the 
picture verification task. This hypothesis was based on the pre-
sumption that ~s in the non-cue condition would fail to resolve the 
ambiguity more often than Ss who had been cued to the presence of 
ambiguity. 
The present study found no significant differences in overall 
processing times between cue and non-cue conditions but, a significant 
difference was found between the two cue conditions in number of 
omission errors and a nearly significant Cue x Type interaction. As 
previously stated, omission errors were defined as the failure of a 
~ to resolve one meaning of the ambiguous sentences although the 
alternate meaning was correctly verified. The non-cue condition had 
more single omission errors than the cue condition. The greater 
number of omission errors indicated either a lack of comprehension of 
the alternate sentence meaning or, though the alternate meaning was 
perceived, the corresponding picture was not indicated in the 
response. 
Previous studies have given only partial explanations for a 
small portion of the reported experimental results. An adequate 
model of linguistic processing must explain the differential 
perceptual processing time for different ambiguity types in the 
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meaning judgment condition, the different PTs in the picture 
verification task, and the difference in omission errors in the cued 
and non-cued conditions. The first stage in the development of such 
a model is the specification of the difference between the present 
meaning judgment task and the meaningfulness task of Mistler-
Lachman (1972). 
Meaning Versus Meaningfulness 
Given the present findings of some differences in the latencies 
for the experimental sentences, a comparison must be made between the 
meaningfulness task of Mistler-Lachman (1972) and the meaning judgment 
task in the present study. As previously mentioned, the meaningfulness 
judgment, especially without any context for the sentences, yielded no 
difference in the perceptual latencies. The lack of any difference 
between the processing times for ambiguous and non-ambiguous 
sentences was attributed to the lack of comprehension when judging 
whether a sentence was meaningful or not. Mistler-Lachman reported 
that some Ss did not even finish reading the sentence before making 
the judgment. Evidently, the Ss were tapping their knowledge of 
sentence structure and semantics (Katz & Fodor, 1963). Mistler-
Lachman (1972) stated that the Ss were not looking for sentence 
meanings as much as searching for semantic anomalies or selectional 
constraints as a basis for a meaningful or non-meaningful response. 
These semantic anomalies usually involved violations of subcategori-
zation rules which according to Chomsky (1965) and Katz and Fodor 
(1963) are essentially syntactic violations. 
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The present data did not agree with the findings of Mistler-
Lachman's meaningfulness judgment task. From the present results, 
it was clear that ambiguity affected processing time. 
The present experiment, then, attempted to test the adequacy 
of the Mistler-Lachman explanation of the data by using a meaning 
judgment task which differed from the meaningfulness judgment in 
one respect. Instead of the ~ simply judging whether a sentence was 
meaningful or not, it was hypothesized that the ~ must comprehend 
the sentence in actively searching for its meaning. This task should 
have required the ~ to finish reading the entire sentence before 
making any judgment about the meaning of the sentence. Given this 
task the S would search the entire syntactic structure, both surface 
and underlying, as well as the meaning for lexical items, for clues 
to the meaning of the sentence. 
The present data supported an hypothesized difference between 
a meaningfulness and meaning judgment. If "levels" of comprehension 
is a valid way to explain linguistic processing (cf. Mistler-Lachman, 
1974), the meaning judgment required a "deeper" comprehension of the 
linguistic strings. 
In the meaning judgment, two fundamental distinctions were 
made between the ambiguous sentences: those with ambiguity on a 
syntactic level and those with ambiguity on a semantic level. A 
significant finding was that lexical ambiguity required a shorter 
time to process than non-ambiguity. 
Lexically, or semantically, based ambiguity was recognized 
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rapidly (5.25 sec. for simple and 5.23 for complex). This search 
may be analogous to the primitive or immediate comprehension which 
includes the invoking of the semantic memory system (Mistler-
I 
' 
Lachman, 1972). This primitive comprehension includes initial word 
decoding, parsing, and the invoking of semantic memory. 
I 
I An hypothesized reason for the short latencies was that the 
I Ss were not parsing the entire sentence but simply cueing in on the single ambiguous word or the ambiguous constituent of the sentence. 
I This cueing would not necessarily require the S to resolve the 
I ambiguity but simply to find a single meaning of the word or constituent. 
t A more complex effect was noted in the meaning judgment task 
when both surface structure and deep structure ambiguity showed 
significantly longer latencies than the unambiguous sentences, though, 
' 
no significant differences were noted between the two types of 
I 
syntactic ambiguity. The longer latencies indicated that these two 
ambiguous categories demanded some extra processing time in the 
linguistic decoding. 
If the meaning judgment were shallow as in the levels of 
"meaningfulness" then no differences in processing times for the 
syntactic ambiguous categories would be expected. 
I The Effect of Instruction 
Prior to a discussion of linguistic processing models, 
consideration must be given to the Cue x Type interaction in the 
meaning judgment task. Although no significant effect was found 
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for cue in the above task, a nearly significant effect was found for 
cue x type. The data in the Cue x Type interaction might explain the 
following: 1) the shorter latencies for the lexically ambiguous 
versus unambiguous sentences, and 2) longer latencies for the syntactic 
ambiguous sentences. 
When compared to the unambiguous sentences, shorter latencies 
for the lexically-based sentences were found only in the cue condition. 
In the non-cue condition nearly equal latencies were obtained for 
unambiguous, simple lexical and complex lexically ambiguous sentences. 
An examination of the instructions for the cue and non-cue condition 
showed that for the cue condition an example of a lexically ambiguous 
sentence was given to the subject. No other type of sentence was 
given to the subject. The lexically ambiguous example might have 
"pre-set" the subject to look for this particular type of ambiguity, 
and to "cue-in" on the locus of ambiguity. A similar effect of 
shorter latencies for the lexically ambiguous sentences was not found 
in the non-cue condition. Once pre-set for the lexically ambiguous 
sentences, the subject may have found the presence of syntactic 
ambiguity and non-ambiguous sentences confusing resulting in longer 
processing times for these latter types of sentences. 
The non-cue condition showed almost identical latencies for 
non-ambiguous, simple, and complex lexically ambiguous sentences. 
The subjects in this condition were given an example of a non-
ambiguous sentence in the instructions. Without a pre-set for lexical 
ambiguity as in the cue condition, the subject could not as easily 
L 
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cue-in on the locus of ambiguity. Instructional bias seems to account 
for the shorter latencies in the cue condition for lexical versus 
unambiguous sentences, and bias may represent the best explanation 
for the lexical latency data. The subjects in the non-cue condition 
did not have the advantage of cueing and their'data is consistent 
with other researchers who have found no effect due to lexical 
ambiguity (e.g., Mistler-Lachman, 1972). The longer latencies in the 
syntactically-based ambiguous sentences, however, cannot be explained 
solely on the basis of the instructional set. 
Although the above explanation of the lexical data pertains 
to a portion of the data, it cannot explain the longer latencies 
in the syntactically-based ambiguous sentences versus the unarn-
biguous sentences. An examination of present linguistic processing 
models might yield an appropriate model for the present data. 
Linguistic Processing: Present Models 
Three general models of ambiguous sentence processing have 
been proposed from past research. A brief review of these models 
may be helpful in understanding that model to be proposed based on 
task demands. 
Carey, Mehler, and Bever (1970) discussed an exhaustive 
computation hypothesis. According to this model all of the possible 
meanings of an ambiguous sentence are encoded and processed and 
finally a choice is made between the meanings. It was hypothesized 
that the differences in ambiguous sentence processing latencies 
reflected the extra time to process two meanings and to choose the 
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appropriate meaning. 
A second model was also proposed (Foss, Bever, & Silver, 1968} 
which has been called the unitary perception model. This model stated 
that a single meaning of an ambiguous sentence is computed with no 
interference from the other possible meanings. The second meaning is 
only computed when contextual information disconfirms the increased 
latencies present. 
A third model, an oblivion hypothesis, was hypothesized by 
MacKay (1966} in which no meaning is assigned to ambiguous sentences 
until there is enough information from context or other sources to 
choose among the possible meanings. 
A fourth model was suggested by Olson and MacKay (1974) which 
was appropriately labeled an interaction model. This model emphasized 
the role of perceptual suppression in the processing of ambiguous 
sentences; especially the lexically ambiguous ones. It was hypoth-
esized that "the ambiguous lexical input simultaneously activates two 
conflicting sets of semantic features which correspond to the two 
meanings of the ambiguity" (Olson & MacKay, 1974, p. 468}. These two 
meanings were said to interact with mutual inhibition at a subthreshold 
level. The perception of the one meaning necessarily required the 
suppression of the other meaning. This model was said to account for 
the usual non-perception of ambiguity in everyday speech. 
Linguistic Processing: A Proposed Model 
The above-presented models of comprehension have given 
explanations of linguistic processing which could apply to the present 
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data. Clearly, process times for the surface syntactic and underlying 
syntactic ambiguity were significantly different from the simple and 
complex lexical ambiguity. Given the data, the ~appeared to be 
making a syntactic versus semantic judgment of ambiguity. 
The finding of no difference in processing time between 
lexically ambiguous and non-ambiguous sentences in the non-cue 
condition suggested two possible explanations. The S could have 
perceived both meanings of the lexically ambiguous sentence but, since 
lexical ambiguity usually involves only one word or phrase, the S 
may have been able to "cue-in" on that one word, and not be forced to 
process the entire sentence. This "cueing-in" could have substantially 
reduced the perceptual latency. 
"Cueing-in" on the locus of ambiguity represents the best model 
of linguistic processing of lexical ambiguity in the non-cue and 
possibly cue conditions. It was hypothesized, however, that complex 
lexical ambiguity would yield longer latencies than simple lexical 
ambiguity. The simple and complex lexical categories showed no 
difference in perceptual times to process. Two reasons are suggested 
for the failure to find a difference. The first explanation states 
that the distinction between simple and complex lexical ambiguity was 
artificial. No other researcher had made this distinction preferring 
to view lexical ambiguity as a unitary phenomenon. This explanation 
is illogical in that the complex lexical ambiguity required the S 
to process a structurally more complex sentence. By definition complex 
lexical ambiguity involved a phrase or constituent of a sentence whose 
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resolution determines the meaning of the entire sentence. This type 
of sentence requires the S to do more than simply "cue-in" on a single 
referent in the sentence. The distinction between simple and complex 
lexical ambiguity does not seem to be an artificial distinction. 
Fodor, Bever, and Garrett (1974) suggested a second explana-
tion, a sequential processing model of ambiguity. This model states 
that if a portion of a sentence has ~possible meanings, only one of 
the ~possible meanings will be processed. This one interpretation 
will be accepted by the S until other disambiguating material is 
encountered which contradicts the interpretation. Support for this 
model has been given by Carey, Mehler, and Bever (1970) and Foss, 
Bever, and Silver (1968). If only one meaning of the simple and 
complex lexically ambiguous sentences are computed, no difference 
would be found in the relative latencies of the lexical categories. 
This model predicts the lack of difference found in the present 
study. 
A combination of subject cueing-in on the locus of lexical 
ambiguity, and the sequential processing model, best describes the 
comprehension strategy. This strategy allows the ~ to process the 
locus of ambiguity without fully comprehending the other components 
of the sentence or the other meanings of the sentence. Mistler-
Lachman (1972) adopted this explanation of processing. She stated 
that immediate comprehension of a sentence might include initial 
word decoding, parsing, and invoking of the semantic memory system. 
Given the nature of lexical ambiguity and the demands of the task, 
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an appeal to the semantic memory might explain the relatively short 
latencies in the lexically ambiguous sentences. Additionally, no 
conclusive evidence exists which would substantiate the hypothesis 
that the lexically ambiguous sentences were disambiguated during 
the meaning judgment. 
The longer latencies for syntactic surface and underlying 
structure processing are more difficult to explain. From the data 
it is clear that the ~ was not processing the syntactically-based 
sentences in the same way as the lexically-based sentences. As will 
be recalled, in the meaning judgment the surface and underlying 
sentences required significantly longer time to process than the 
unambiguous sentences. In addition, the surface and underlying 
syntactic sentences were not significantly different from each other 
in processing latencies. A sequential model does not predict the 
long latencies although it would predict the finding of no difference 
between the syntactic surface and underlying sentences. The "cueing-
in on the locus of ambiguity" explanation may not apply because of 
the complex nature of the syntactic relationships in the sentences. 
Fodor, Bever, and Garrett (1974) proposed a second 
simultaneous processing model of ambiguity. According to this model, 
if a portion of a sentence has n possible meanings each of the n 
structures is computed and carried in short-term memory. If no dis-
ambiguating material is encountered by the S all ~ analyses are 
retained. The sentence is comprehended in ~ways as ambiguous. This 
particular model predicts that ambiguity will increase time to 
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process because of the ~paths of analysis and computation that must 
be held in memory. Of the various models discussed, the simultaneous 
model may provide the best explanation for the syntactic data. The 
ambiguity in the syntactically-based sentences did contribute to the 
memory load. 
A question remains about the finding of no difference in the 
latencies between the surface and underlying syntactic ambiguities. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, underlying syntactic ambiguous sentences 
did not yield longer latencies than the surface syntactic ambiguous 
sentences. In the non-cue condition the underlying ambiguity even 
showed a non-significantly shorter latency than the surface type. 
According to the data, the resegrnenting of the surface structure 
took as much time as the specification of the complex underlying 
relations in the underlying type. This finding is not entirely 
unexpected if the linguistic processing of syntactic structure is 
examined. According to the Standard Theory the underlying relations 
of an ambiguous surface string must be disambiguated before the 
surface structure can be resegrnented. The syntactic analysis in both 
the surface and underlying ambiguous sentences is in the underlying 
structure. Thus, the primary processes of disambiguation are nearly 
identical for both types of syntactic ambiguity. Once the underlying 
structure has been disambiguated, the resegrnentation of the surface 
structure is accomplished in a relatively short time. 
The data indicated that the ~ was capable of comprehending 
the sentences semantically or syntactically depending on the demands 
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of the experimental materials. The ~was capable of recognizing the 
type of ambiguity involved and cueing-in on the locus of ambiguity 
if lexical or using a simultaneous processing method of analysis if 
syntactic. The strongest argument for this explanation is that the 
unambiguous sentences fell between the syntactic and lexical 
categories. Sachs (1967) alluded to this dual comprehension under-
lying normal linguistic processing. The Ss were able to shift 
"cognitive gears" depending on the ambiguity involved. The results 
of the present study indicated that the Ss were able rapidly to 
determine whether a sentence was ambiguous or not, determine whether 
the ambiguity was syntactically-based or lexically-based, and then 
use the cognitive process which best fit the demands of the 
experiment. The complexity of the ambiguity was less important than 
whether it was syntactic or lexical in nature. This apparent ability 
of the ~ rapidly to shift processing strategies had not been noted 
in previous literature. 
The picture verification condition showed somewhat more 
complicated effects than the meaning judgment. All types of ambiguity 
showed longer latencies than the unambiguous types. This effect was 
due.to the demands of the experiment. The ambiguous sentences 
required the S to choose two pictures and the unambiguous sentences 
required the S to choose only one of the four pictures presented. 
In the picture verification task for the lexical ambiguity, the ~ 
was not as easily able simply to cue-in on the locus of ambiguity as 
in the meaning judgment. This may have resulted in significantly 
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longer latencies for the simple and complex lexical ambiguity versus 
the unambiguous sentences. 
Between ambiguity types, the picture verification task showed 
results similar to the meaning judgment. The lexically-based 
sentences combined had significantly shorter latencies than the 
surface and underlying syntactic latencies. The S was again making 
an explicit distinction between syntactic and lexical ambiguity. The 
syntactic ambiguity involved either a rearrangement of the surface 
structure components or a specification of deep structure relation-
ships. The pictures reflected the inherent complexity of the 
ambiguous syntactic relationships. The lexical ambiguity, however, 
involved a quicker decision process. This ambiguity usually involved 
either a single component of the sentence or a single constituent of 
the sentence. The ~could rapidly scan the pictures which resolved 
this "simpler" type of ambiguity. The picture verification task 
also indicated that the latency for underlying ambiguity was not 
significantly different from the latency for surface ambiguity. The 
data also indicated that simple lexical ambiguity did not differ 
significantly from complex lexical ambiguity. The latencies, how-
ever, were in the hypothesized direction of longer latencies for the 
complex lexical ambiguity versus the simple type. 
The simultaneous model of ambiguous sentence processing seems 
best to fit the data for the picture verification condition. As 
previously noted, this model predicts an increase in memory load with 
ambiguous sentences. Both meanings of the sentence must be available 
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to the S if he is to perform the verification task. The ~may still 
make the basic distinction between the syntactic and lexical type of 
ambiguity yielding longer latencies in the surface and underlying 
syntactic ambiguity and shorter latencies in the simple and complex 
lexical ambiguity. 
Cue Versus Non-cue 
The hypothesized longer latencies in the cue condition were 
not confirmed by the present data. No model of linguistic processing 
immediately suggests itself. Logically, longer latencies should be 
obtained in the cue condition as the ~ actively searches for the 
ambiguity in the experimental sentences. The non-cue condition 
should have shown shorter latencies than the cue condition because 
the S would not be immediately aware of the ambiguity. 
Two hypotheses are offered as possible explanations of the 
cue versus non-cue data. Although the ~might not have been 
immediately aware of the ambiguity in the non-cue condition, over a 
number of trials the ~ could eventually have recognized the presence 
of ambiguity in the sentences. No data confirms this explanation 
because the first ten "practice" trials were not used in the data 
analysis. During the first ten trials the S may have recognized 
the ambiguity; therefore, by sentence 11 the non-cue condition would 
be the same as the cue condition. The second explanation might be 
that since the example of ambiguity given the subject was that of 
lexical ambiguity, the subject was "pre-set" for lexical ambiguity. 
The possibly rapid processing of such anticipated ambiguity as 
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structure resegmented can the ambiguity be resolved. It was this 
ambiguity resolution which contributed to the latencies in the surface 
syntactically ambiguous sentences. Again, similar findings were noted 
in the picture verification condition. 
Finally, the present study emphasized the importance of an 
adequate production model for linguistic processing. The abstract 
competence model of grammar as developed by Chomsky (1965) provided 
new insights into the understanding of the structure of natural 
grammars. By definition, however, the competence model does not 
specify the processes underlying grammar use. The production model 
must account for such processes as: sentence recognition, perception 
strategies, sentence storage, linguistic disambiguation, and sentence 
retrieval from long-term memory. 
·, 
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SU~Y 
The present study examined the effect of various types of 
ambiguity on linguistic processing. Basic to the study were the 
concepts of deep and surface structure as originally hypothesized 
by Noam Chomsky. 
Five types of sentences were used: unambiguous, syntactic 
surface ambiguous, syntactic underlying ambiguous, simple lexical 
ambiguous, and complex lexical ambiguous sentences. A total of 50 
sentences, 10 of each type, were presented in a random order on a 
rear-projection screen. Four pictures were drawn for each of the 
sentences which either depicted the meaning or meanings of the 
sentence or were related in a general way to the theme of the 
sentence. 
A total of 60 Ss were used in the study: 30 males and 30 
females. Each S was tested individually on two different tasks: a 
meaning judgment and a picture verification task in one of two 
different instruction conditions. One instruction condition, the cue 
condition, told the ~ about the presence of ambiguity in the experi-
mental materials and then gave an example of an ambiguous sentence. 
The instructions for the non-cue condition did not mention linguistic 
ambiguity and no example of ambiguity was given to the S. After 
being given the cue or non-cue instructions, the ~was asked to press 
the button which he was holding in order to engage the first slide. 
After the sentence appeared, the ~was asked to press the button again 
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when he understood the meaning of the sentence. Four pictures on a 
single slide appeared and the ~ was asked to choose the picture or 
pictures which gave a visual explanation of the sentence. 
The latencies for both the meaning judgment and picture 
verification tasks were automatically recorded each time the ~ 
pressed the button. The latencies were defined as perception time 
(PT). 
In addition to the perception times, omission errors in the 
picture verification task were recorded. Omission errors were defined 
as a single error in conjunction with a single correct response. 
This data reflected the S's failure to resolve both meanings of the 
ambiguous sentences. 
The results were as follows: In the meaning judgment task 
the longest latencies occurred for the underlying and surface 
syntactic ambiguous sentences and the shortest latencies occurred for 
the lexically ambiguous sentences. The latencies for the unambiguous 
sentences were shorter than the latencies for the syntactic types 
and longer than the latencies for the lexical types. In the picture 
verification task, the latencies were as follows: syntactic ambiguous 
types, lexically ambiguous types, and unambiguous sentences. Finally, 
the non-cue condition showed more omission errors than the cue 
condition. 
The results were discussed in terms of a proposed model of 
linguistic processing. This model combined a parallel processing 
model with a "cueing-in on the locus of ambiguity" model. The data 
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showed that an individual is able to distinguish between non-ambiguous, 
syntactically-based ambiguous, and lexically-based ambiguous sentences. 
This data also showed that an individual is able to use different 
perception strategies depending on the type of linguistic material 
encountered and the type of task demanded of the individual. 
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Tree diagram of an underlying syntactic ambiguous sentence. 
The shooting of the hunters was terrible. 
Meaning 1: St. 1 (Someone) shoot hunters. 
St. 2 is terrible. 
Meaning 2: St. 1 Hunters shoot (something) . 
St. 2 is terrible. 
Meaning 1 
____.-sl------s~ VP 
/ 2'-... /~ 
r6 VP V NP 
I /~ I 
N V /NP~ N 
Art N 
I I 
(Someone} shoot the hunter 
& pl. 
is & 
past 
terrible 
Meaning 2 
& 
progress 
~sl--------/s2 ""'- (Same} 
/\ /VP""' 
Art N V NP 
I ~ 
The hunter 
& pl. 
shoot 
& 
progress 
(something} 
Source of ambiguity: the syntactic relationship of hunters to the 
embedded sentence. 
Meaning 1: 
Meaning 2: 
hunters is object of the verb in s2• hunters is subject of the verb in s2 • 
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Stimulus sentences used in the experimental tasks. 
Unambiguous sentences 
The little girls had pretty new bath towels. 
He was sleeping when the tornado hit. 
The problem had not seemed easy in the statistics class. 
You could see the elephants racing toward the jeep. 
She was learning to bake cookies. 
A cherry topped the sundae. 
After the clown's antics Marion couldn't help laughing. 
I want the new lamp and lampshade. 
Johnson and Brown were the prisoners on trial. 
Most little children love playing in the snow. 
Surface syntactic ambiguous sentences 
I was feeding her dog biscuits. 
The boys ran out of the boxes. 
The three masted British ships sailed south. 
Friends gave her baby blankets. 
You could see the animals running from the car. 
Julia had never seen a real buffalo kill before. 
The hostess greeted the girl with a smile. 
The little girls bent old clothes hangers. 
The stout major's wife waved at the ship. 
Aunt Grace enjoyed telling her children stories. 
Underlying syntactic ambiguous sentences 
James Bond broke the window with the Russian. 
Even the Russians could not stop praying. 
The idea of Hitler was so awful they left the room. 
The raiding of the Indians was pitiful. 
Mario did not like fighting in the alley. 
Aunt Hazel got me the last gift for nothing. 
Dr. Emerson took the two Africans to kill them. 
The shooting of the hunters was terrible. 
The mayor asked the police to stop fighting. 
The missionary is ready to serve. 
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Simple semantic ambiguous sentences 
Marcia bought beautiful new glasses. 
The office of the president was vacant. 
They always welcomed the cardinal in the springtime. 
Dot's slip was embarrassing to her date. 
The solution had not seemed easy in the chemistry class. 
After several painful strokes he died. 
A large crowd gathered to see the star. 
He did not know the nickle was valuable. 
Willard was not sure of the right fork. 
Billy and Judy enjoyed the slides. 
Complex semantic ambiguous sentences 
May and Joan didn't expect to improve their figures during 
the course. 
John's withdrawal will result in a loss of interest. 
He did not expect the paper to cover everything. 
On top of everything there was a tarpaulin. 
Malcolm was struck by the point. 
He wears a light sweater in the summer. 
The end of the game is the loss of the king. 
Andy replaced the cast. 
Mrs. Davis did not seem anxious to press the suit. 
The author wrote the story of the year. 
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·A B 
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Underlying Syntactic Ambiguous Sentence: The idea of Hitler 
was so awful they left the room. 
Correct Pictures: B and D 
•----------------------
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A B 
C D 
Simple Lexical Ambiguous Sentence: A large crowd gathered to see 
the star. 
Correct Pictures: A and C 
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Surface Syntactic Ambiguous Sentence: The boys ran out of the 
boxes. 
Correct Pictures: A and B 
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Unambiguous Sentence: He was sleeping when the tornado hit. 
Correct Picture: c 
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Complex Lexical Ambiguous Sentence: The end of the game is 
the loss of the King. 
Correct Pictures: A and B 
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